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Abstract—Recently, Lee et al. proposed a Remote Authentica-
tion Model of Information Appliances (RAMIA). Unfortunately, 
RAMIA has a fatal error that opens the entire home network of 
information appliances to hackers. In this paper, we propose a 
new Secure Remote Control Model for Information Appliances 
(SRCMIA) to fix this error. Besides, our model can also achieve 
both message authentication and one-time secret communication 
in just one message.
Index Terms—Authentication, information appliance, remote 
control, confidentiality. 
I. INTRODUCTION
In the field of information appliances (IAs) in a home net-
work environment, many scholars [5, 7–9] have proposed 
various IA control mechanisms. However, the studies of 
introducing remote authentication [3, 4] to the control of IAs 
are scanty relatively. Recently, in 2004, Lee et al. [6] 
proposed a low computation cost Remote Authentication 
Model of Information Appliances (RAMIA) based on Chien et 
al.’s [1] authentication scheme. Unfortunately, RAMIA is 
vulnerable to parallel session attacks and masquerade attacks. 
Especially, as indicated in [11], a successful masquerade 
attack will open the entire home network to a hacker, which is 
a fatal damage in RAMIA. For people, however, it is very 
convenient to turn on the air conditioner before they arrive at 
home. Therefore, a control model for IAs with more secure 
remote authentication is indispensable. 
In this paper, we propose a Secure Remote Control Model 
for Information Appliances (SRCMIA) using a novel au-
thentication and control protocol. The remainder of this paper 
is presented as follows. In Section II, we demonstrate the 
protocol of our SRCMIA. In Section III, we analyze the 
security, efficiency, and functionality of our model. Finally, a 
concluding remark is given in Section IV. 
II. OUR SRCMIA PROTOCOL
Our SRCMIA not only authenticates a remote user’s IA 
commands through insecure public communication channels 
but also executes and reports back the execution results of the 
IA commands. Fig. 1 illustrates our SRCMIA structure, which 
Fig. 1. The proposed SRCMIA structure. 
is similar to that of RAMIA. The remote device can be a 
mobile phone, a PDA, and so on. The Home Controller 
cooperates with the remote device to provide remote control 
services including authentication, encryption/decryption, and 
IA control. The security objectives of our model include 
confidentiality, mutual authentication, and easy to use. The 
SRCMIA protocol consists of three phases: the registration 
phase, the control phase, and the reporting phase. 
A. Registration Phase 
Assume a user Ui submits his identity IDi and password 
PWi to the Home Controller over a secure channel for 
registration. If the request is accepted, the Home Controller 
computes Ri = h(IDi � x) � PWi and issues Ui a smart card 
containing Ri and h(�), where x is a secret key maintained by 
the Home Controller, � is the bitwise XOR operation, and h(�)
is a collision-resistant one-way hash function [10]. 
B. Control Phase 
Fig. 2 shows the messages exchanged in the control phase 
and the reporting phase; the first message is sent in the control 
phase, while the second message is sent in the reporting phase. 
When the user Ui wants to control a particular IA through a 
remote device Di, he first inserts his smart card into the remote 
device. Then, he inputs his IDi and PWi to the device and 
selects an IA command Mc that specifies the operation to be 
performed on the controlled IA. The smart card inside the 
device Di performs the following computations: 
(1) Compute C1 = Ri � PWi (= h(IDi � x)).
(2) Generate a random number P.
(3) Compute Hc = Mc � h(C1 � P), where h(C1 � P) is used 
as a session key to encrypt the IA command Mc.
(4) Compute C2 = h(T || Hc || P || C1), where T is current 
timestamp, and || is the string concatenation operation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
CTIVISM often refers to vigorous or intentional actions 
that aim to bring about social or political change [1]. The 
rapid development of the Internet makes it an ideal source for 
information and propaganda dissemination [2] [3]. Cyber 
activists use web sites, forums, and other types of computer 
media to build relationships with the public, voice their 
opinions, and spread their propaganda [4] [5]. Consequently, 
Cyberactivism, which refers to activism on the Internet, has 
emerged as a new and important social phenomenon. 
A comprehensive and systematic framework for analysis of 
Cyberactivism needs to be developed for researchers, analysts, 
and related government agents to get a better understanding of 
cyber activists and their online communities. For example, it 
has been observed that web sites of related activism groups are 
linked to each other through hyperlinks, creating their own 
community network [6]. A good research framework would 
include an effective method to identify such networks and the 
roles of the web sites in the networks. In forums, social 
networks of forum users, representative topics and phrases, and 
active users are useful information that can help understand 
member interactions. 
This paper presents a case study of online Free Tibet 
activities and is an initial attempt toward a framework to 
analyze Cyberactivism. Two popular Internet media, web sites 
and forums of Free Tibet activities, are identified, collected, 
and analyzed. We aim to shed light on the following research 
questions:
1. What automated methods can be used to analyze 
Cyberactivism? 
2. What knowledge and insights can we gain through 
social network and topical analysis of Cyberactivism? 
II. FREE TIBET
Tibet generally refers to the Tibet utonomous Region, a 
provinc -level entity governed by the People's Republic of 
China (PRC). Religion is extremely important to the Tibetans 
and Tibet is the traditional cente  of Tibetan Buddhism. 
Panchen Lamas nd Dalai Lamas are two well-known spiritual 
leaders of Tibetans.
Tib t was first included int  Chi a’s territory in the 1300s. 
At the beginning of the 20th century, Tibet and Mongolia 
signed a treaty proclaiming mutual recognition and their 
independence from the Republic of China.  When the China 
Civil War ended in 1949, Tibet became a part of the PRC. In 
1959, PRC armies thwarted the Tibetan resistance movement 
and Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama, fled to India. 
The Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), also referred to 
as the Tibetan Government in Exile (TGE), is headed by the 
14th Dalai Lama and claims to be the rightful and legitimate 
government of Tibet.  Free Tibet activities refer to activities 
that aim to support the independence of Tibet. Most Free Tibet 
activities are guided by the CTA. 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
Free Tibet related web sites and forums are the focuses of 
this case study. Such web sites and forums are created and 
maintained by activists, supporters, and sympathizers in a 
variety of languages, including English, Chinese, and Tibetan. 
In this study, we propose different methodologies for analysis 
of each medium. 
A. W b Site Analysis 
1) Identifying and Collecting I portant Web Sites 
Since there are many Free Tibet web sites available, the first 
step is to identify which ones are important. Fig. 1 shows our 
identification process. 
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Fig. 2. Messages transmitted in the control phase and the reporting phase. 
(5) Send (IDi, T, Hc, P, C2) to the Home Controller via the 
remote device Di and wait for report until timeout, where 
timeout is an event signifying the end of the pre-defined 
waiting period. 
(6) If timeout occurs, then report failure to the user Ui and 
stop.
Upon receiving the control message (IDi, T, Hc, P, C2) from 
the device Di, the Home Controller performs the following 
operations: 
(1) If T is not in the pre-defined valid time interval, then 
ignore the received message and stop. Note that in this 
case, the received message is a replayed message. 
(2) Compute C1� = h(IDi � x) and C2� = h(T || Hc || P || C1�).
(3) If C2�ЋC2, then ignore the received message and stop. 
Note that the Home Controller may log the event for 
further investigation. 
(4) Compute Mc = Hc � h(C1� � P). 
(5) Accept the received message and send Mc to the 
specified IA for execution. 
Note that we use h(C1 � P), instead of h(C1), as a session 
key to encrypt Mc into Hc for two reasons. First, all IA com-
mands (such as Mc) are structured and known to the public. 
Second, the total number of all different IA commands is 
relatively small. Therefore, if h(C1) is used, an adversary can 
easily derive h(C1) from Hc = Mc � h(C1) using relatively 
small number of intercepted control messages (IDi, T, Hc, P,
C2), and thus break our encryption. By using h(C1 � P) as a 
session key, the ciphertext Hc = Mc � h(C1 � P) will become 
a one-time ciphertext due to the random number P.
C. Reporting Phase 
After the specified IA finishes executing Mc, it will send an 
execution report Mr back to the Home Controller. Then, the 
Home Controller performs the following operations. 
(1) Generate a random number Q.
(2) Compute Hr = Mr � h(C1� � Q). Note that h(C1� � Q) is 
used as a session key to encrypt the execution report Mr.
(3) Compute C3 = h(T' || Hr || Q || (C1�+1)), where T' is the 
current timestamp. 
(4) Send (T', Hr, Q, C3) to the remote device Di.
After receiving the report message (T', Hr, Q, C3) from the 
Home Controller, the smart card inside the remote device Di
proceeds as follows. 
(1) If T' is not in the pre-defined valid time interval, then 
ignore the received message and stop. Note that again the 
report message is a replayed one. 
(2) Compute C3� = h(T' || Hr || Q || (C1+1)). 
(3) If C3�ЋC3, then report failure to the user Ui and stop. 
(4) Compute Mr = Hr � h(C1 � Q). 
(5) Accept the received message and report Mr to the user Ui
via the remote device Di.
III. ANALYSIS OF OUR SRCMIA 
In this section, we analyze the security of our SRCMIA 
model in Part A, the efficiency of our model in Part B, and its 
functionalities in Part C. 
A. Security Analysis 
In this part, we examine the security of our model as 
follows: 
1. Secure shared secret. The shared secret between the 
legal user Ui and the Home Controller is C1 = h(IDi � x).
Since C1 is protected by the collision-resistant one-way 
hash function h(�), it is infeasible for a malicious person 
to derive the shared secret C1 from C2 or C3. Note that a 
collision-resistant one-way hash function h(�) satisfies (i) 
one-way: for any given value Y, it is impossible to find X
within useful lifetime such that h(X) = Y, and (ii) colli-
sion-resistance: for any given block A, it is impossible to 
find another block B within useful lifetime such that BЋ
A and h(B) = h(A) [12]. 
2. Resistance to replay attack. Replaying either the control 
message (IDi, T, Hc, P, C2) or the report message (T', Hr,
Q, C3) will be detected due to the freshness check of time 
stamps. It should be noted that using timestamps must 
satisfies the time-synchronization requirement. There are 
many other nonce-based schemes to avoid the synchro-
nization problem. However, using nonces needs extra 
communications and is thus not suitable in our IA 
applications. 
3. Resistance to parallel session attack. Since the 
difference between C1 in C2 = h(T || Hc || P || C1) and 
(C1+1) in C3 = C3� = h(T' || Hr || Q || (C1+1)) causes an 
asymmetric structure on the two message authentication 
codes transmitted between the remote device Di and the 
Home Controller, the parallel session attacks discovered 
in [2] will fail. 
4. Mutual authentication. If a malicious attacker modifies 
the transmitted messages, the modification will be 
discovered through checking the message authentication 
codes C2 or C3. Except for the user Ui and the Home 
Controller, no one can obtain the shared secret value C1
to compute correct C2 or C3 to pass the checks. Similarly, 
if the attacker tries to impersonate a legal user Ui or to 
masquerade as the Home Controller, he has to prepare 
the valid control message (IDi, T, Hc, P, C2) and report 
message (T', Hr, Q, C3) for mutual authentication, 
respectively. However, no one can create valid message 
authentication code C2 or C3 without knowing C1.
5. Confidentiality. In our SRCMIA protocol, the session 
key Kc = h(C1 � R) is used to encrypt IA commands and 
the session key Kr = h(C1� � Q) is used to encrypt 
execution reports, where R and Q are random numbers. 
A malicious attacker cannot derive the correct Kc and Kr
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using only the known random number R and Q without 
knowing C1. Besides, both Kc and Kr are real session key 
because the random number R and Q are different. In 
addition, even if the attacker obtains the above session 
keys Kc and Kr, by applying the known random number 
R and Q, respectively, the person still cannot derive C1
due to the one-way property of the secure hash function. 
Therefore, without knowing C1, no one can derive any 
other session keys using just known random numbers 
and the known session keys. As such, the confidentiality 
of both the encrypted IA commands and their encrypted 
execution reports is achieved. Since the session keys are 
XOR-ed with IA commands or execution reports, it 
implies that the lengths of session keys, all IA commands, 
and all execution reports are all the same. 
6. Resistance to known plaintext attack. The purpose of the 
known plaintext attack tries to derive the encryption key 
through analyzing the ciphertext and its corresponding 
known plaintext. In our SRCMIA model, the equation Hc
= Mc � Kc, where the session key Kc = h(C1 � P) is used 
to encrypt Mc. If Hc and Mc are known, then Kc can be 
derived from Kc = Mc � Hc. However, the derived Kc is 
useless because Kc is a one-time session key. Similar ar-
gument can also be applied to Hr = Mr � Kr in 
encrypting execution report Mr.
7. Resistance to weak password attack. In our SRCMIA 
protocol, there is no password related information trans-
mitted over public network. Hence, an attacker has no 
target for comparison to guess the password offline. 
8. One-time secret communication. Based on timestamps 
and the shared secret C1, in our model the receiver can 
successfully authenticate the identity of the sender, 
verify the freshness and integrity of the received message, 
and decrypt the attached one-time ciphertext created 
using a one-time session key. Our protocol can also be 
used in other applications that need only unidirectional 
authentication, such as sending just one secret short 
message. 
B. Efficiency Analysis 
Because of the limited computation capacity of the smart 
card, the remote device, and IAs, the issue of communication 
and computation cost is very important. Our model achieves 
mutual authentication using just two message exchanges. In 
terms of computation cost, in the control phase and the 
reporting phase, the smart card inside the remote device 
performs only 4 hashing operations, and the Home Controller 
performs only 5 hashing operations. In other words, our model 
is very efficient. 
C. Functionality Analysis 
1. Confidentiality. In our model, an IA command Mc and its 
execution report Mr are encrypted with one-time session 
keys Kc and Kr, respectively. It guarantees the confiden-
tiality of the transmitted IA commands and execution 
reports. 
2. Mutual authentication. In the control phase and the 
reporting phase, the remote device and the Home Con-
troller authenticate each other with message authentica-
tion codes C2 and C3. If both the checks on C2 and C3 by 
each receiving side are valid, the mutual authentication is 
guaranteed. 
3. Low cost and simple computation. As shown in Part B, 
efficiency analysis, we can see that our model satisfies 
the requirement. 
4. Easy to use. The registration of our model is very simple 
and the remote users can freely choose their own 
passwords. When the remote user wants to control an IA 
remotely, he just needs to input his identity IDi,
password PWi and the IA command Mc.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel Secure Remote Control 
Model for Information Appliances, namely SRCMIA, which 
extends Chien et al.’s solution and solves the security problem 
of Lee et al.’s RAMIA model. The advantages of our model 
include no verification table, freely chosen password, mutual 
authentication, and low communication and computation cost. 
In addition, our model satisfies the following requirements of 
IAs: (1) confidentiality, (2) mutual authentication, (3) low cost 
and simple computations, and (4) easy to use. 
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Abstract —Cyberactivism refers to the use of the Internet to 
advocate vigorous or intentional actions to bring about social or 
political change. Cyberactivism analysis aims to improve the 
understanding of cyber activists and their online communities. In 
this paper, we present a case study of online Free Tibet activities. 
For web site analysis, we use the inlink and outlink information of 
five selected seed URLs to construct the network of Free Tibet 
web sites. The network shows the close relationships between our 
five seed sites. Centrality measures reveal that tibet.org is 
probably an information hub site in the network. Further content 
analysis tells us that common hub site words are most popular in 
tibet.org whereas dalailama.com focuses mostly on religious 
words. For forum analysis, descriptive statistics such as the 
number of posts each month and the post distribution of forum 
users illustrate that the two large forums FreeTibetAndYou and 
RFAnews-Tibbs have experienced significant reduction in 
activities in recent years and that a small percentage of their users 
contribute the majority of posts. Important phrases of several 
long threads and active forum users are identified by using 
mutual information and TF-IDF scores. Such topical analyses 
help us understand the topics discussed in the forums and the 
ideas and interest of those forum users. Finally, social network 
analyses of the forum users are conducted to reflect their 
interactions and the social structure of their online communities. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
CTIVISM often refers to vigorous or intentional actions 
that aim to bring about social or political change [1]. The 
rapid development of the Internet makes it an ideal source for 
information and propaganda dissemination [2] [3]. Cyber 
activists use web sites, forums, and other types of computer 
media to build relationships with the public, voice their 
opinions, and spread their propaganda [4] [5]. Consequently, 
Cyberactivism, which refers to activism on the Internet, has 
emerged as a new and important social phenomenon. 
A comprehensive and systematic framework for analysis of 
Cyberactivism needs to be developed for researchers, analysts, 
and related government agents to get a better understanding of 
cyber activists and their online communities. For example, it 
has been observed that web sites of related activism groups are 
linked to each other through hyperlinks, creating their own 
community network [6]. A good research framework would 
include an effective method to identify such networks and the 
roles of the web sites in the networks. In forums, social 
networks of forum users, representative topics and phrases, and 
active users are useful information that can help understand 
member interactions. 
This paper presents a case study of online Free Tibet 
activities and is an initial attempt toward a framework to 
analyze Cyberactivism. Two popular Internet media, web sites 
and forums of Free Tibet activities, are identified, collected, 
and analyzed. We aim to shed light on the following research 
questions:
1. What automated methods can be used to analyze 
Cyberactivism? 
2. What knowledge and insights can we gain through 
social network and topical analysis of Cyberactivism? 
II. FREE TIBET
Tibet generally refers to the Tibet Autonomous Region, a 
province-level entity governed by the People's Republic of 
China (PRC). Religion is extremely important to the Tibetans 
and Tibet is the traditional center of Tibetan Buddhism. 
Panchen Lamas and Dalai Lamas are two well-known spiritual 
leaders of Tibetans.
Tibet was first included into China’s territory in the 1300s. 
At the beginning of the 20th century, Tibet and Mongolia 
signed a treaty proclaiming mutual recognition and their 
independence from the Republic of China.  When the China 
Civil War ended in 1949, Tibet became a part of the PRC. In 
1959, PRC armies thwarted the Tibetan resistance movement 
and Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama, fled to India. 
The Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), also referred to 
as the Tibetan Government in Exile (TGE), is headed by the 
14th Dalai Lama and claims to be the rightful and legitimate 
government of Tibet.  Free Tibet activities refer to activities 
that aim to support the independence of Tibet. Most Free Tibet 
activities are guided by the CTA. 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
Free Tibet related web sites and forums are the focuses of 
this case study. Such web sites and forums are created and 
maintained by activists, supporters, and sympathizers in a 
variety of languages, including English, Chinese, and Tibetan. 
In this study, we propose different methodologies for analysis 
of each medium. 
A. Web Site Analysis 
1) Identifying and Collecting Important Web Sites 
Since there are many Free Tibet web sites available, the first 
step is to identify which ones are important. Fig. 1 shows our 
identification process. 
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